Retroactivity by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 48 
Number 3 Volume 48, March 1974, Number 3 Article 28 
August 2012 
Retroactivity 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1974) "Retroactivity," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 48 : No. 3 , Article 28. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol48/iss3/28 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
Retroactivity
It is settled that Dole rights are available in any action which was
still in the trial or appellate process at the time of the Dole decision.245
Whether Dole was meant to be fully retroactive is yet to be determined.
The Court of Appeals engrafted one limitation on Dole's applicability
when it held in Codling v. Paglia2 48 that a settlement agreed upon before
Dole and prior to trial precluded the defendant from obtaining Dole
apportionment. The Supreme Court, Albany County, however, recently
held in Lampila v. Harrington247 that where there is not merely a
naked settlement, but a settlement prompted by a pre-Dole judgment,
the opportunity to seek apportionment of damages is available.248
The Appellate Division, First Department, reached the opposite
conclusion in Glicksman v. Smith,249 where a pre-Dole third-party claim
had failed under the active-passive test. The court affirmed the trial
court's refusal to entertain a second third-party complaint, deeming
the original dismissal a final judgment, unaffected by a subsequent
change in the law. This decision draws the First Department into con-
flict with the Second Department,2 0 which is in accord with the better
view that the doctrine of the law of the case should not be applied in
light of the predominating interest of effectuating the policy of Dole.
The purpose of Dole was to eliminate the frequent injustice produced
by the active-passive dichotomy. To rely upon a prior dismissal of the
complaint under this now discredited rule to reject a claim for equit-
able apportionment defeats this purpose.
245 Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 286 N.E.2d 241, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851
(1972); Frey v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 80 N.Y.2d 764, 284 N.E.2d 579, 333 N.Y.S.2d 425
(1972) (mem.). See, e.g., Mosca v. Pensky, 41 App. Div. 2d 775, 842 N.Y.S.2d 76 (2d Dep't
1973) (mem.); Liebman v. County of Westchester, 41 App. Div. 2d 756, 841 N.Y.S.2d 567
(2d Dep't 1973) (mem.); Hain v. Hewlett Arcade, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 991, 338 N.Y.S.2d
791 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.); Brown v. City of N.Y., 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 37 N.Y.S.2d 685
(1st Dep't 1972); Moreno v. Galdorisi, 39 App. Div. 2d 450, 336 N.Y.S.2d 646 (2d Dep't
1972); Meade v. Roberts, 71 Misc. 2d 120, 335 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1972);
Sanchez v. Hertz Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 449, 333 N.YS.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1972).
But see Glomboski v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 72 Misc. 2d 552, 338 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1972) (mem.).
246 32 N.Y.2d 330, 344, 298 NXE.2d 622, 629-80, 845 N.Y.S.2d 461, 471 (1973).
247 76 Misc. 2d 423, 851 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973).
248 The court noted that while the Court of Appeals has held Dole applicable to
pending cases, it has never held this to be the limit of its retroactivity. Id. at 426, 351
N.YS.2d at 346.
249 43 App. Div. 2d 544, 349 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1st Dep't 1978).
250 See Mosca v. Pensky, 41 App. Div. 2d 775, 342 N.YS.2d 76 (2d Dep't 1978) (mem.);
see also Liebman v. County of Westchester, 41 App. Div. 2d 756, 841 N.Y.S.2d 567 (2d Dep't
1978) (mem.), where a third-party complaint was upheld because the damages segment
of the trial was still pending.
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Some had predicted that Dole would prompt the re-opening of
hundreds of pre-Dole actions involving multiple tortfeasors, 251 but this
has not occurred. The Lampila decision, holding as it does in favor of
full retroactivity, should alert the practitioner to the possibility that his
"dead" files may in fact be alive with Dole claims.2 52
It should be noted that, even if the Dole claim is struck, contribu-
tion may still be available under CPLR 1401 if the prior judgment
was obtained jointly against the party from whom contribution is
sought.
Waiver
While CPLR 1401 has been termed "near dead,"253 it maintains
some further vitality where the right to Dole apportionment has been
waived.25 In Caucci v. Fesko,255 the action was commenced one month
after Dole, and the trial judge's charges in accordance with pre-Dole
law went unchallenged at trial and on appeal. A subsequent claim for
relative contribution on cross-motion to a CPLR 1401 motion was
rejected by the Supreme Court, Westchester County, on the theory that
the failure to raise Dole rights before final judgment constituted a
waiver.
While Dole apportionment can generally be had in a separate
indemnity action, this right is not available where it could have been
asserted in the original action via crossclaim.25 6 In the present case,
the omission to assert Dole was not an inadvertence but was part of
the trial strategy.2 57 Where this is so, little reason exists to give the
party a second chance. However, this situation will rarely occur since
251 See, e.g., Welborn v. DeLeonardis, 168 N.Y.L.J. 3, July 6, 1972, at 2, col. 4, 5
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), wherein the court expressed fear that full retroactive application of
Dole would "create a chaotic situation .. "
252 The statute of limitations will generally pose no difficulty. It commences upon
payment of the judgment, Musco v. Conte, 22 App. Div. 2d 121, 254 N.Y.S.2d 589 (2d Dep't
1964), and runs for six years. CPLR 213(2) (McKinney 1972). See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3019,
supp. commentary at 239 (1973).
253 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 241 (1973).
254 For a discussion of the waiver of Dole rights see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp.
commentary at 230 (1973); Note, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Revolution in New York
Law, 47 ST. JoHN's L Rxv. 185, 208 (1972).
255 76 Misc. 2d 614, 349 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1973).
256 76 Misc. 2d at 616-17, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 889, quoting 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3019,
supp. commentary at 241 (1973). See Henriquez v. Mission Motor Lines, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d
782, 339 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
257 Professor David D. Siegel recommends that because of the newness and importance
of Dole rights, there should be a presumption against waiver and "[t]he dearest indications
of intent to waive, the strongest showing of prejudice to other litigants, or at least a dis-
tasteful combination of those things should be required to overturn the presumptions."
7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3019, supp. commentary at 241 (1973).
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